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In this paper, we aim to show that the framework of embedded, distributed, or extended cognition offers new perspectives on social
cognition by applying it to one specific domain: the psychology of memory. In making our case, first we specify some key social dimen-
sions of cognitive distribution and some basic distinctions between memory cases, and then describe stronger and weaker versions of
distributed remembering in the general distributed cognition framework. Next, we examine studies of social influences on memory in
cognitive psychology, and identify the valuable concepts and methods to be extended and embedded in our framework; we focus in par-
ticular on three related paradigms: transactive memory, collaborative recall, and social contagion. Finally, we sketch our own early stud-
ies of individual and group memory developed within our framework of distributed cognition, on social contagion of autobiographical
memories, collaborative flashbulb memories, and memories of high school at a high school reunion. We see two reciprocal benefits of this
conceptual and empirical framework to social memory phenomena: that ideas about distributed cognition can be honed against and
tested with the help of sophisticated methods in the social-cognitive psychology of memory; and conversely, that a range of social mem-
ory phenomena that are as yet poorly understood can be approached afresh with theoretically motivated extensions of existing empirical
paradigms.
 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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Paradigms in which human cognition is conceptualised
as ‘‘embedded’’, ‘‘distributed’’, or ‘‘extended’’ have arisen
in different areas of the cognitive sciences in the past
20 years. These paradigms share the idea that human cog-
nitive processing is sometimes, perhaps even typically,
hybrid in character: it spans not only the embodied brain
and central nervous system, but also the environment with
its social or technological resources (Clark, 1997, 2007;
Haugeland, 1998; Hollan, Hutchins, & Kirsh, 2000; Hutch-1389-0417/$ - see front matter  2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.cogsys.2007.07.002
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E-mail address: abarnier@maccs.mq.edu.au (A.J. Barnier).ins, 1995, 2006; Kirsh, 1996, 2000, 2006; Norman, 1993;
Sutton, in press-a; Wilson, 1994). Such views of cognition
share a scepticism about the adequacy of conceptualizing
cognition as a process that begins and ends at the skull.
One motivation for adopting a perspective in which cog-
nition is embedded, distributed, or extended begins with
reflection on the fact that neural systems do not operate
in causal isolation from their environments. Moreover,
the nature and level of causal integration across the divide
between individual and environment suggests that cogni-
tive systems themselves often involve the coupling of neu-
ral, bodily, and external systems in complex webs of
continuous reciprocal causation. Through evolution and
ontogenetic development we have gained capacities skilfully
34 A.J. Barnier et al. / Cognitive Systems Research 9 (2008) 33–51to hook up with or incorporate external physical and cul-
tural resources that over time have themselves become
apt for incorporation into more encompassing, extended
cognitive systems. In this way, we form temporarily inte-
grated larger cognitive units that incorporate distinct but
complementary inner and outer components, often making
‘‘the world smart so that we can be dumb in peace’’ (Clark,
1997, p. 180). Embodied human minds extend into a vast
and uneven world of things—artefacts, technologies, and
institutions—which they have collectively constructed and
maintained through cultural and individual history.
Often-cited examples of distributed cognition include
studies of the instruments and procedures involved in nav-
igation; the physical objects and epistemic tools used in
processing orders in a cafe´; the tangle of notes and records
with which an academic paper is written; the way skilled
bartenders employ unique glasses to remember cocktail
orders; or the sketchpads without which abstract artists
cannot iteratively re-imagine and create an artwork (Beach,
1988; Clark, 1997, 2001; Hutchins, 1995; Kirsh, 2006; van
Leeuwen, Verstijnen, & Hekkert, 1999). Developing
research programmes in distributed cognition and the
extended mind are being tested and applied in disciplines
ranging from science studies (Giere, 2002) to cognitive
archaeology (Knappett, 2005), computer-supported coop-
erative work (Halverson, 2002), and Shakespeare studies
(Tribble, 2005). Philosophical defenses of the extended
mind (Clark & Chalmers, 1998; Rowlands, 1999; Wilson,
2004) have generated a robust, critical, ongoing debate
about the conceptual foundations of the approach (Adams
& Aizawa, 2001, 2007; Clark, in press; Menary, 2006;
Rupert, 2004).
This literature on ‘‘the cognitive life of things’’ (Sutton,
2002a) has fuelled a rather technophilic style in distributed
cognition research, occasionally resulting in a preoccupa-
tion with technology to the relative neglect of social sys-
tems (Clark, 2003; Clark & Chalmers, 1998). Yet in most
complex real-world contexts, distributed cognitive pro-
cesses involve the skilful interactive simultaneous coordina-
tion of things and people. One natural strategy to address
the methodological challenges this poses is to seek insight
from and integration with research traditions that focus
on interpersonal interaction in cognition. This is to draw
attention to the social aspects of distributed cognitive pro-
cesses, to cases in which other people—rather than arte-
facts—are the more-or-less enduring partners in coupled
or transactive distributed cognitive systems.
In this paper we thus aim to show that the distributed
cognition framework offers new perspectives on social cog-
nition by applying it to one specific domain: the psychology
of memory (see also Tollefsen, 2006). In particular, we
argue that independent lines of research on memory—
about relations between individual memory and social
groups—can be better understood and developed by recon-
ceiving them within this theoretical framework. This focus
on the social distribution of cognition is particularly appro-
priate in thinking about memory, since encoding, storage,and retrieval in real-world contexts all frequently involve
the cognitive activities of more than a single individual.
This integrative project should have benefits both ways.
On the one hand, ideas about distributed cognition can
be honed against and tested with the help of sophisticated
methods in the social-cognitive psychology of memory;
conversely, a range of social memory phenomena that are
as yet poorly understood can be approached afresh with
theoretically motivated extensions of existing empirical
paradigms.
The empirical work on transactive and collaborative
remembering that we survey below covers just one of a
number of fields to which the framework of distributed
and extended cognition can be brought to bear: we could
also refer to studies of multi-agent interaction in AI (Kon-
ing & Ling, 2003), small-group research in social psychol-
ogy (Fiske & Goodwin, 1994), or (closer to our concern
with memory) the flourishing social-interactionist tradition
in the developmental psychology of autobiographical mem-
ory. In this last field, for example, 20 years of research has
built up a rich picture of early personal memory capacities
emerging from the dynamical interaction of distinct com-
ponents in a social-cultural-cognitive-neural system (Nel-
son & Fivush, 2004), where the relative influence of
multiple concurrent processes can vary across cases (Grif-
fiths & Stotz, 2000; Reese, 2002; Smith & Thelen, 2003;
Sutton, 2002b). Early joint attention to the past between
carers and children slowly helps the child achieve a grasp
of the causal significance of the order of events, of the
availability of distinct perspectives on the same past time,
of the uniqueness of actions, and of the affective and social
significance of the sharing of memories (Campbell, in press;
Hoerl & McCormack, 2005). Independent work on chil-
dren’s explanatory knowledge, and particularly on their
knowledge about the social division of cognitive labour
(Lutz & Keil, 2002; Rozenblit & Keil, 2002; Wilson & Keil,
2000), is also relevant here. While we will not discuss this
developmental work further in this paper, the picture of
early personal memory as socially distributed clearly dove-
tails with the view of the cognitive psychology of memory
that we offer below.
The conceptual and empirical benefits that flow from
this exploration of the social distribution of memory might
also include the forging of new multidisciplinary middle-
ground for memory studies. While mainstream philosophy
of mind has largely neglected social aspects of remember-
ing, studies of ‘‘collective memory’’ and ‘‘cultural memory’’
abound in a burgeoning interdisciplinary field spanning
sociology, anthropology, history, political theory, and
media theory (Bloch, 1998; Kansteiner, 2002; Klein, 2000;
Olick, 1999; Wertsch, 2002). We think that such social
memory studies are potentially relevant for cognitive sci-
ence and philosophy, and believe that both psychologists
and humanities scholars can contribute directly to better
understandings of the relations between broader studies
of national or cultural memory and the typical individual
or small-group focus of cognitive psychology with its
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2005a). Since the phenomena in question in social memory
studies do not recognize disciplinary boundaries, it is par-
ticularly important to seek both conceptual clarity on key
terms and effective shareable methods (see also Hirst &
Manier, in press).
In the next section we flesh out the kind of memory phe-
nomena in which we are particularly interested. We specify
some of the key social dimensions of cognitive distribution,
and some of the basic distinctions between cases that our
psychological studies need to respect and investigate. We
also briefly show how our approach to distributed remem-
bering can be interpreted within stronger or weaker ver-
sions of the general distributed cognition framework.
Then in Section 3 we examine studies of social influences
on memory in cognitive psychology, identifying the valu-
able concepts and methods to be extended and embedded
in our framework. Here we focus in particular on three
related paradigms: transactive memory, collaborative
recall, and social contagion. In Section 4 we sketch our
own early studies of individual and social memory devel-
oped with the framework of distributed cognition in mind.
2. Memory as a test case for distributed cognition
2.1. Autobiographical memory and external influence
While remembering past experience is an activity of
intense personal significance, the functions and expressions
of autobiographical memory are, equally obviously, deeply
embedded in our social world, in adult life as well as child-
hood. Recollecting specific episodes from the personal past
can play many different cognitive, emotional, and interper-
sonal roles. Alongside the importance of forging, maintain-
ing, and sharing an accurate grasp of past events, the
activity of remembering itself keeps the past alive for a
variety of present purposes, which is one reason why the
qualitative and affective tone of our memories is often
entangled and renegotiated in our practical reasoning over
time. For example, autobiographical memory shapes and
in turn is shaped by our self-conceptions: my decision-mak-
ing, my choices, and my values are driven in part by the
content of ongoing activities of remembering which have
themselves been sculpted in part by my working selves,
with their goals and their motivations (Barnier et al.,
2007; Barnier, Hung, & Conway, 2004; Conway, 2005; Nel-
son, 2003). We also rely on personal memory to teach or
inform others, to develop and maintain intimacy, to elicit
or show empathy, and to share mundane or significant sto-
ries. In short, autobiographical memory is not simply
about accurately recalling episodes from one’s past; it is
also enmeshed in our broader ongoing cognitive lives.
In general, we live these cognitive lives, and engage in
the activities that constitute them, in the company of oth-
ers. Our experiences, especially our significant experiences,
are often joint experiences with others of importance to us,
such as friends and family. And when our experiences havenot been shared by family or friends, we often relate those
experiences to them. Sometimes we learn (often to our
delight or relief, sometimes to our dismay) that others have
had similar experiences. And when we have experienced
something alongside other people—for example, when a
group of us went through some phase of life together as
a cohort, or when we have deliberately engaged in a course
of joint action—our later accountings and attempts to
understand ‘‘how it went’’ can be of great emotional
importance for both individuals and the enduring group.
In the strongest such cases, long-standing groups return
often to rethink or talk through the same shared past
events and experiences, perhaps reevaluating their lives or
their relationships in part on the basis of, or by way of,
reinterpretations of the shared past. Significant reconsider-
ation and redirection of values and plans can be not only
triggered by but also enacted in renegotiation of some
still-live past.
But in more mundane cases too, as Campbell (in press)
puts it, ‘‘sharing memory is our default’’ (p. 4). Even those
occasions when we are silent about our pasts ‘‘have some of
their meaning in relation to our natural habit of sharing the
past’’ (p. 4). How much does this fact matter? What does it
imply about the nature of autobiographical memory? And
does it suggest that there is room for a social ontology of
memory, as there may be for intention, belief, or action
(Gilbert, 1989; Searle, 2006; Velleman, 1997), or for empir-
ical research into memory in social groups? On many dom-
inant views in both philosophy of mind and cognitive
psychology, the sharing of memories is only of limited sig-
nificance. The presence and contribution of other people as
real or imagined participants in activities of remembering is
seen, at best, as only one external causal trigger for and
influence on the real memory processes in the individual;
or, at worst, as a disrupting or contaminating influence
on individual autobiographical memory.
In the powerful tradition of cognitive psychological
work on false memory, for example, evidence for the con-
structive nature of remembering is typically interpreted in
an individualist fashion. Elizabeth Loftus writes, for exam-
ple, that ‘‘misinformation has the potential for invading
our memories when we talk to other people’’ (Loftus,
1997, p. 51). Construction is equated with distortion, thus
minimizing the adaptability of memory’s intrinsic dynam-
ics, by which the very mechanisms that underlie generaliza-
tion can in certain circumstances lead us astray
(McClelland, 1995; Schacter, 1999). And external influence
is typically characterized as primarily negative, the relent-
less intrusion of the social into malleable individual mem-
ory. Such views fail to do justice to the extraordinary
diversity of social memory phenomena, especially to the
ways in which sharing our past can facilitate our access
to it and our capacity to negotiate its legacies. Truth, and
related values like accuracy and fidelity in memory, need
be neither simple nor singular: ordinary and successful
remembering, far from being inevitably compromised and
corrupted by other people, may be ‘‘relational’’, depending
36 A.J. Barnier et al. / Cognitive Systems Research 9 (2008) 33–51directly on the support and uptake of other people (Camp-
bell, 2003, 2006).
A more nuanced picture of the complex and often posi-
tive roles of external social influence in remembering need
not, however, remain distant from the best work in cogni-
tive science. The versions of distributed cognition and
extended mind hypotheses on which we draw are entirely
compatible with computational and representational theo-
ries of mind (Rowlands, 1999; Wilson, 1994, 1995, 2004).
Computational efficacy is often enhanced by allowing
information to remain outside the brain, and by thus
exploiting environmental and social resources rather than
having to encode everything relevant internally. A robust
integration of the social sciences of memory with the cog-
nitive sciences in this area will require better conceptual
resources, empirical methods, and more precise distinctions
which align with (even if they do not mimic) the central dis-
tinctions between modes and kinds of memory developed
in cognitive psychology. The experimental work described
below is a natural extension of existing ways of studying
the episodic and autobiographical forms of long-term
declarative memory. Investigations into other forms of
memory may also be of considerable interest, going beyond
the ‘‘collected memory’’ (Olick, 1999) approach that views
the memories of groups summatively (e.g., Schwartz &
Schuman, 2005). To convey a better sense of the spaces
of possibilities for research on the social distribution of
memory, we need to be explicit about some of the dimen-
sions to that space.
2.2. Dimensions of distribution in remembering
On the distributed cognition view, remembering agents
may gain new capacities when they hook up and coordinate
with, or rely on specific other people or resources, or when
trained with particular learned techniques. We can examine
such distributed memory systems and identify the dimen-
sions on which they vary. For example, some distributed
memory systems may be little more than aggregates of indi-
vidual rememberers, while others involve collective agents
as truly emergent entities (Poirier & Chicoisne, 2006; Wim-
satt, 1986). In other words, in some cases it is appropriate
simply to sum individual memories, for instance those of a
bunch of strangers who happened to witness the same acci-
dent. But in other cases—if, for example, these witnesses
later discuss or debate intensely the details of the accident
among themselves—the account of the past which emerges
may differ significantly from such an additive mere juxta-
position of individual memories. This is the strategy we
want to deploy: refining a theory with a range of specified
dimensions on which individual cases can vary, and simul-
taneously refining our empirical methods for working out
just where on each dimension the cases fall. In the case
of social interactivity, as our development of the notion
of collaborative recall will show, there are many different
group contexts of recall, and many different ways in which
the short- or longer-term outcome of social interaction canbe something quite other than the mere sum of pre-existing
individual memories.
We should expect no general answer to the question of
whether social effects bring greater or lesser accuracy, qual-
itatively richer or thinner memories, more or less agree-
ment, or more or less confidence. These are all
independent dimensions that have to be teased apart for
each kind of interaction, because different forms of collab-
oration have different costs and benefits, different func-
tions, and different effects on the subsequent fate of the
memories which each individual takes away from the inter-
action with others. The most fruitful approach, in our view,
is one that seeks to articulate the conceptual and empirical
space in which socially distributed memory can be
explored. The initial empirical studies reported in Section
4 begin to do so: here we set out more explicitly some of
the dimensions of this space.
As we have already suggested, we can distinguish
between experiences that are in some way held in common,
jointly experienced at the time of encoding, and those that
are not. There are then further distinctions among varieties
of such unshared and shared experiences. Some of the
experiences that we do not share are nonetheless similar,
such as common, major events in high school (final exams,
graduation dance), while others are entirely unique to each
of us. And of those that are shared with others (at encod-
ing), some are merely accidentally shared, as when we all
hear separately about some news item of general public
interest, while others are shared because we acted together,
as (for example) a tightly knit group over our last year at
school. Again, turning our attention to retrieval, remem-
bering can be done in isolation (in various ways and for
various purposes), or under a range of increasingly collab-
orative conditions with other people. Even unshared expe-
riences can be remembered collaboratively with some
particular audience or interlocutors, when others play some
part (helpful or intrusive, supporting or misinforming) in
the processes of recall; while shared experiences can be
remembered in company in merely minimal ways, such as
when we all just take turns to remember parts of the past,
or in more transactive and interactive fashion, when we are
jointly involved in a collective project of revisiting and
reevaluating what we once went through together. Collab-
oration takes many forms, and can be supportive of good
remembering as well as a source of distortion.
In effect, this is to claim that there is no single character-
ization of what it is either to ‘‘share an experience’’ or to
‘‘collaboratively recall’’, since these will vary along the
dimensions we have specified. The same is true of what it
is to be a member of a social group, a question usefully
informed by recent work in both social theory and the phi-
losophy of biology. Margaret Gilbert, for example, argues
that even a fairly transitory collectivity can form a genu-
inely plural subject—potentially the subject of memories
as well as intentions, beliefs, and actions—as long as its
members pool their wills and share certain forms of com-
mon knowledge of their mutual awareness (Gilbert, 1989,
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grated collectivity to have more enduring mechanisms of
self-regulation, so as to be (for example) answerable as a
group to its past actions and judgements (List, in press;
Pettit, 2003; Pettit & Schweikard, 2006). Meanwhile, the
revival of work on group selection in the philosophy of
biology has reinvigorated discussion of what groups need
to be like in order to be ‘‘units of selection’’ and, more gen-
erally, causal agents in the process of natural selection
(Okasha, 2007; Sober & Wilson, 1998; Sterelny, 1996; Wil-
son, 2005b, 2007).
So understanding the nature of the group matters in the
study of social memory phenomena both in relation to the
experiences encoded, and in identifying particular forms of
collaboration in recall. Some distributed systems are one-
offs, establishing transient and easily dissoluble relations,
which may yet exhibit high degrees of emergence: as we
noted, people who have been thrown together by chance,
for example, in witnessing the same accident or being
together when they hear of a public figure’s death, may find
their memories strongly linked in and by discussion of this
incident alone. But in other cases we can identify transient
but regularly repeatable integrated groupings of people
who come together in thinking and talking about the past
for a range of present purposes. The narratives revisited in
the context of the family unit, or among a tightly knit
group of colleagues or old allies, have their own familiar
flavour, both constrained and enabled by the ongoing
uptake and interests of the various interlocutors. The sto-
ries of the shared past, of the events that we remember,
are continually renegotiated as we improvise and riff
around them with more or less control, and thus they come
to have their own autonomy and integrity and internal ten-
sions and lacunae.
From the point of view of theories of distributed cogni-
tion, here we are studying ‘‘the durability and reliability of
the extended cognitive system that results from the func-
tional integration’’ of distinct resources (Wilson & Clark,
in press). We aim at richer taxonomies which allow us to
identify variously stronger cases of collaborative remem-
bering of shared experiences. From this perspective, the
‘‘extended mind’’ label naturally marks not a metaphysi-
cally distinct set of cognitive systems, but simply those
which score more highly on these dimensions of durability
and reliability, and in which the new capacities of the cou-
pled system are ‘‘sufficiently robust and enduring as to con-
tribute to the persisting cognitive profile’’ of an individual
(Wilson & Clark, in press). As the work on transactive
memory described below suggests, socially distributed
memory systems will often be more efficient and more
appealing if they are more enduring: a partner or a lifelong
friend holds more of my past, and can often help me nego-
tiate it more appropriately, than a new acquaintance.
By using the inclusive labels ‘‘social memory phenom-
ena’’ and ‘‘collaborative remembering’’ here, we intend
not only to mark out the space for such multidimensional
enquiry, but also explicitly to resist the urge towards anagreed advance definition of ‘‘collective memory’’. ‘‘Collec-
tive memory’’, whatever it may be, is unlikely to differ from
individual memory on just one criterion. We need to map,
both conceptually and empirically, a range of increasingly
strong cases before we decide whether we have found any-
thing worthy of such a label. By acknowledging the reality
of many weaker cases, in which (for example) unshared
experiences are remembered in one of many less interactive
ways, we make room for stronger cases that score more
highly on more of the dimensions of distribution we have
sketched.
With this in mind, and adapting an earlier discussion of
the group mind hypothesis in the biological and social sci-
ences (Wilson, 2004, 2005b), we now consider in turn three
different theses that might direct research on social memory
phenomena:
• The Triggering Thesis: remembering is a cognitive pro-
cess that takes place inside individuals, although it can
be initiated, at either the encoding or the retrieval phase,
by social phenomena.
The Triggering Thesis may be true of some activities of
remembering. But it has also come to play a global, struc-
turing role in how many cognitive scientists and philoso-
phers think about the place of ‘‘the social’’ in memory.
In fact, many cognitive psychologists in particular would
take the Triggering Thesis to provide an exhaustive, cap-
sule statement of the way to conceptualise the role of social
phenomena in the process of memory. On this view, social
phenomena are merely external contexts, triggers or inputs
to in-the-head remembering. We suggest that this view,
construed as a global view about social memory phenom-
ena, is mistaken. Although the Triggering Thesis may pro-
vide an appropriate background assumption for some
investigations of social influences on memory, we illustrate
below our reasons for thinking that our empirical and con-
ceptual frameworks need to go beyond this thesis in order
to do justice to the full range of social memory phenomena.
• The Social Manifestation Thesis: remembering is a cog-
nitive process that can only be manifested or realized
when the individuals engaged in that process form part
of a social group of a certain kind.
While the Social Manifestation Thesis shares with the
Triggering Thesis a view of remembering as an individ-
ual-level process, a process whereby it is individuals who
are the agents of acts of remembering, these two theses
differ in terms of whether they view memory as an individ-
ual-bound phenomenon or one that crosses the bodily
boundary. The Social Manifestation Thesis could be read
as saying that remembering is essentially social in that it
is only individuals in groups (of certain kinds) who
remember. But just as we believe that the Triggering Thesis
is wrong if understood as a global claim about the essence
or nature of memory in general, so we prefer a more
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ommend understanding of this thesis as saying that certain
kinds or episodes of remembering are social in that only
individuals in groups (of certain kinds) remember in these
characteristic ways. This is the view which operates as
background to our discussion of empirical studies of social
memory phenomena in the rest of this paper.
• The Group Mind Thesis: remembering is a cognitive
process that groups themselves, rather than the individ-
uals that compose those groups, engage in.
The Group Mind Thesis contrasts importantly with the
other two theses, in suggesting that remembering is actually
a group-level phenomenon, one where it is groups that are
the agents of memory. Like the Social Manifestation The-
sis, it will seem wildly implausible to cognitive scientists,
especially psychologists, if read as making global, essential-
ist claims about memory. We concur, although we will not
be defending or exploring the Group Mind Thesis here: but
we again note that this is not how the Group Mind Thesis
should be understood, when considered as part of an
attempt to broaden the space of possibilities for studying
the social distribution of memory. Either the Social Mani-
festation Thesis or the Group Mind Thesis may be right
about the nature of certain types of remembering, even if
neither has any prima facie plausibility when regarded as
views of memory in general. Precisely the same, as we
noted above, is true of the Triggering Thesis. Once the
three theses have been redescribed in the ways we recom-
mend, as potentially applying only to certain kinds or epi-
sodes of remembering, they are compatible (at least
potentially) rather than in conflict. We do not then have
to make a once-and-for-all theoretical decision about
which of the three is true: in principle at least, each might
be true of different phenomena which could all be explored
empirically.
Although we do see the Group Mind Thesis, in certain
forms, as worthy of further clarification and reconsidera-
tion, we have nothing more to say about it here, save to
point out that it is independent of the Social Manifestation
Thesis. But we do think that the Social Manifestation The-
sis expresses an important truth about a range of social
memory phenomena. Although the methodological and
conceptual amendments to existing psychological para-
digms which we suggest below do not yet take us far
towards a demonstration of its scope, which would require
more thorough empirical exploration of the space of possi-
bilities in question, they do point towards some of the types
of remembering which are socially manifested.
3. An empirical framework
In this section we review studies on social influences on
memory from cognitive psychology. We focus in particular
on research that has sought to explore the relationship
between individual memory, individual memory in smallgroups, and some notion of small-group ‘‘collective’’ mem-
ory. The purpose of this review is to identify the valuable
concepts and methods from three research traditions:
transactive memory, collaborative recall and social conta-
gion, which can be extended and embedded in our applica-
tion of the distributed cognition framework to
autobiographical memory. Each of these traditions has
its own assumptions about the differences between remem-
bering alone and remembering in a group, each has its own
way of measuring this group influence, and each focuses on
certain kinds of groups and certain kinds of memories (see
also Harris, Paterson, & Kemp, in press). Although each
has been explored primarily against the theoretical back-
drop summarized by the Triggering Thesis, we think that
research in each tradition can be profitably reconceptual-
ized and extended under the umbrella provided by the
Social Manifestation Thesis.
3.1. Transactive memory
According to Wegner (1987) and Wegner, Giuliano, and
Hertel (1985), transactive memory is a ‘‘set of individual
memory systems in combination with the communication
that takes place between individuals’’ (Wegner, 1987, p.
186). That is, transactive memory involves the sharing
across individuals within certain kinds of relationships or
social groups of the encoding, storage and retrieval of indi-
vidual memory. Wegner’s theory is important because, in
comparison to more individualistic theories, it captures a
truly shared memory system and speaks to the kinds of
social memory phenomena that we are most interested in.
However, his theory has failed to generate broad empirical
attention and has mainly been tested in applied, organisa-
tional settings and with non-autobiographical stimuli.
Transactive memory theory predicts that memories
recalled by the individuals in the transactive system will
be more than the sum of individual memory. That is, trans-
active memory systems should have emergent properties
(properties which differ from the mere sum of the proper-
ties of their parts), either in terms of the amount of infor-
mation recalled or the quality of that information. For
instance, Wegner et al. (1985) described a couple discussing
a shared party experience. The male partner says that he
noticed that a male friend of theirs (‘‘Tex’’) was depressed
and hardly talked, while the female comments that earlier
in the evening Tex seemed over friendly. This prompts
the male partner to remember a previous occasion where
Tex mentioned he was thinking of splitting from his wife.
Together, the couple concludes that Tex was flirting with
the female partner and was embarrassed about it when
he encountered the male partner. This version (regardless
of its accuracy) will now become their memory of the
events, and it is quantitatively and qualitatively different
from what each remembered alone.
Transactive systems might be possible amongst casual
acquaintances, people thrown together by chance, or
strangers, since individuals routinely make assumptions
A.J. Barnier et al. / Cognitive Systems Research 9 (2008) 33–51 39about the expertise of others based on factors such as their
age, race, gender, or profession. However, the most effi-
cient systems are likely to develop over time among people
who repeatedly remember together, such as couples, fami-
lies or colleagues (Wegner et al., 1985; see also Tollefsen,
2006) since communication is the key to an efficient trans-
active system (Hollingshead, 1998a). People in close rela-
tionships have information that each alone is responsible
for knowing (differentiated, non-redundant information),
as well as information that is shared by all members of
the group, whether between a couple or among a family
(integrated, redundant information). Wegner argued that
a successful relationship requires some differentiation of
information, for the sake of efficiency, but also some inte-
gration of information, or ‘‘common knowledge’’. Differ-
entiation means that the group, as a unit, can store and
access more information than the individuals could alone.
Integration means that the group can produce new infor-
mation, since group members can cue each other to pro-
duce more information about that topic than they each
would alone (for more on redundancy and information
sharing see Ohtsubo, 2005; Tindale & Sheffey, 2002).
In a typical transactive memory experiment, individuals
are paired with someone they know (e.g. intimate partner,
co-worker) or with a stranger to complete a memory task
that involves learning and recalling information in different
knowledge areas (e.g. science, sport, history, etc.). Partici-
pants rate the extent to which they believe that they and
the (known or unknown) person they are paired with know
about each category, and are told that they will be remem-
bering with the person they are paired with, and that their
responses will be pooled. They then learn information indi-
vidually and, subsequently, recall with the other person
(see Fig. 1).
The limited work conducted so far has shown that peo-
ple in long-term relationships perform better on these cat-Paired with known partner
RATE EXPERTISE    LEARN INFORMA
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Fig. 1. Transactive megorised memory tasks than pairs of individuals (Wegner,
Erber, & Raymond, 1991). However, this advantage is only
apparent when pairs are allowed to use their own structure
at learning; pairs of strangers perform better when struc-
ture is imposed (Wegner et al., 1991). Interestingly, collab-
oration during learning (rather than only during recall)
impairs the recall of couples compared to strangers. Hol-
lingshead (1998b) found that couples who learned alone
but collaborated at recall performed better than pairs of
strangers. However, when the groups collaborated at learn-
ing as well as at retrieval, pairs of strangers performed bet-
ter than couples (Hollingshead, 1998b). Hollingshead
(1998b) argued that the attempt to discuss and develop
explicit learning strategies impeded the couple by encour-
aging them to depart from their usual implicit, transactive
system.
Transactive memory experiments have mainly used sim-
ple stimuli, such as knowledge pooling tasks or categorised
word lists. So far, little research has examined transactive
systems for the kinds of information that a couple or fam-
ily may encounter daily, such as performing household
tasks or remembering autobiographical events. Applied
organisational research has tended to focus on group task
performance, such as assembling a radio (Ren, Carley, &
Argote, 2006) or more ecologically valid performance mea-
sures of fulfilling company objectives (Austin, 2003), but
everyday social applications of transactive memory gener-
ally have not been explored. Despite this limitation and
unlike many other cognitive memory paradigms, experi-
ments on transactive memory consider what happens in
real, established groups. And unlike other cognitive para-
digms that see social influence only in terms of contamina-
tion or misinformation, transactive memory assumes that
group memory can be positive; Wegner’s theory focuses
on the functional and adaptive nature of sharing memory
work in stable groups.TION   RECALL INFORMATION 
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In a typical collaborative recall experiment, partici-
pants are presented with stimuli (usually words) on a
computer screen and instructed to remember them. Sub-
sequently, participants recall these words either individu-
ally or in a group (recall 1). Finally, all participants recall
individually again (recall 2). The effect of collaboration
on recall is indexed by a (between groups) comparison
between the number of items recalled by individuals
alone and groups on recall 1, as well as between the
number of items recalled by collaborative groups and
nominal groups. Nominal group recall is calculated by
pooling the non-overlapping items recalled by the same
number of individuals as in the collaborating group,
but recalling alone. For example, imagine there are three
participants in each group. Nominal group recall would
be taken by pooling the recall of sets of three participants
who recalled individually. If participant 1 recalls items A,
B, C, D, participant 2 recalls items A, D, F, and partic-
ipant 3 recalls items B, C, G, H, the pooled non-overlap-
ping recall is items A, B, C, D, F, G and H. This is then
compared to collaborative group recall to index the
effects of collaboration on items remembered vs. forgot-
ten (see Fig. 2).
The effects of collaboration on recall can be conceptua-
lised in terms of costs and benefits (Basden, Basden, &
Henry, 2000). Typically, collaborative groups recall more
than individuals alone, but less than nominal groups. This
deficit is termed collaborative inhibition. However on subse-Individuals
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Fig. 2. Collaborativequent individual recall, those who previously recalled in a
group are more likely to remember additional items than
those who recalled individually, but only those items that
were introduced by another group member. People who
recall in groups are less likely to recall items that did not
appear in the group recall (Basden et al., 2000). The focus
of these comparisons is on the amount of information
recalled.
Although the collaborative recall procedure was intro-
duced by Weldon and Bellinger (1997) as a measure of
‘‘collective memory’’ and the emergent properties of
group memory—the title of their paper was ‘‘Collective
memory: Collaborative and individual processes in
remembering’’—the most commonly cited explanation
for collaborative inhibition focuses on individual rather
than group processes. Basden, Basden, Bryber, and Tho-
mas (1997) argued that recalling information in a group
setting interrupts people’s individual retrieval strategies,
making them less efficient. This hypothesis was supported
by a series of experiments that manipulated interruption
of retrieval strategies (Basden et al., 1997; Finlay, Hitch,
& Meudell, 2000; Wright & Klummp, 2004). Across these
studies, researchers essentially treat social processes and
the social context as analogous to any other (within-
the-head) disruption of recall strategy.
The exact procedure used across studies has varied
greatly, and while some of these variations may be
important in understanding collaborative recall, their
effects have not been systematically tested. One set of
important variations has been the nature of the group:L 1     RECALL 2 
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dynamics. Given our comments above, this dimension
is crucial. For example, group recall in collaborative
recall experiments has either consisted of non-interactive
collaboration, ‘‘turn-taking’’ (e.g., Basden et al., 2000),
or more genuinely interactive collaboration, reaching a
consensus (e.g., Finlay et al., 2000). Other research has
compared collaborative recall in groups of acquaintances
and groups of strangers, with mixed results. Anderson
and Ronnberg (1995) reported less collaborative inhibi-
tion in groups of friends, while Gould, Osborn, Krein,
and Mortenson (2002) reported no difference between
married and unacquainted dyads. Most recently, Cuc,
Ozuru, Manier, and Hirst (2006) examined the effects
of group dynamics (specifically, a dominant narrator)
on the collaborative recall of stories by families. Families
with a dominant narrator were more likely to develop
‘‘collective’’ or convergent memories than families with
more egalitarian conversational dynamics. These findings
indicate that the type of collaboration, the nature of the
group, and the roles adopted by group members during
collaboration may all be crucial predictors of group
memory performance.
Another important feature of real-world social remem-
bering is that it usually occurs for personal and poten-
tially emotional and significant autobiographical events.
In the first study of its kind, Yaron-Antar and Nachson
(2006) examined collaborative recall for more complex
emotional material. They asked Israeli students to collab-
orate in remembering the assassination of Prime Minister
Rabin and found that groups showed the standard
collaborative inhibition effect. Although Yaron-Antar
and Nachson (2006) argued that collaborative inhibition
occurs for personal, emotional material, the questions
they used were largely semantic rather than
autobiographical (e.g. ‘‘Who accompanied the prime
minister to the hospital?’’). Thus it remains unclear
whether groups will invariably show costs of collabora-
tion, even for more emotional and important everyday
memories.
Overall, the findings from collaborative recall experi-
ments are limited by the types of groups and the types
of stimuli studied so far. Researchers have also tended
to focus primarily on individual cognition and on the
negative outcomes of group remembering (i.e., does the
group remember less than the individual?). But in real-
world group remembering, accuracy is only one goal of
recall, and operates alongside social goals, such as estab-
lishing relationships or making a good impression, devel-
oping and maintaining intimacy, teaching and informing
others, and eliciting or providing empathy (Alea &
Bluck, 2003). Thus, group memory may be qualitatively,
not just quantitatively, different from individual memory.
Laying aside these limitations, the collaborative recall
paradigm offers a robust methodology for indexing the
effects of discussion on memory, both during the discus-
sion itself and on subsequent individual recall.3.3. Social contagion of memory
The social contagion paradigm measures the impact
on an individual’s memory of recalling the same event
with one or more other people. Procedurally, this para-
digm is very similar to collaborative recall. In a typical
social contagion experiment, participants first learn mate-
rial, together with a confederate. Second, they recall with
the confederate who introduces some incorrect details
about the material. Third, participants recall again indi-
vidually (see Fig. 3; e.g., Meade & Roediger, 2002;
Roediger, Meade, & Bergman, 2001). In a variation of
this paradigm, labelled the ‘‘memory conformity’’ proce-
dure, participants in a group learn what appears to be
the same material. However, unknown to them, each
individual is shown a slightly different version of the
same material (e.g., they see the same video of a robbery,
but with slightly different details for the offender). Sec-
ond, they recall together. Third, participants recall again
individually (e.g., Gabbert, Memon, & Allan, 2003).
Whereas the collaborative recall paradigm focuses on
the amount of correct information that is forgotten, the
social contagion (and memory conformity) paradigm
focuses on the amount of incorrect information that is
remembered.
Roediger et al. (2001) found that people came to falsely
remember items from a slideshow when they were sug-
gested by a confederate during collaborative recall. In this
experiment, final recall was private and individual, and
accuracy was emphasised. In other experiments, partici-
pants were warned that the confederate may have men-
tioned false items (Meade & Roediger, 2002). Thus, these
participants did not simply add the suggested items to their
recall to conform with the experimental demands or with
the confederate, but rather because they genuinely believed
the suggested items were present in the slideshow. Gabbert
et al. (2003) extended this paradigm to a more natural set-
ting, in which the participants engaged in discussions with
other participants who, unknown to them, had seen a
slightly different video of a crime. They found that 71%
of witnesses who had discussed the event went on to recall
individually items they had not themselves seen. Roediger
et al. (2001) also reported benefits for social contagion sim-
ilar to collaborative recall. Participants’ subsequent indi-
vidual recall was higher for the correct items introduced
by the confederate, as well as the incorrect items. In other
words, participants incorporated both correct and incor-
rect information into their recall following group
collaboration.
Similar to the collaborative recall paradigm, the focus of
comparisons within this paradigm is on the amount of
information recalled; specifically, the number of contagion
items recalled. Some research has indicated that the quali-
ties of the suggested information can influence the social
contagion effect, with false items that are more consistent
with the genuine items more likely to be incorporated into
recall (Roediger et al., 2001). However, other qualitative
Control Items
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Fig. 3. Social contagion of memory procedure.
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remembering, such as emotion and motivational value,
have not been examined.
Social contagion effects often have been accounted for
by a source monitoring explanation. According to the
Source Monitoring Framework (Johnson, Hashtroudi,
& Lindsay, 1993) information from many sources can
be utilised to construct a memory for an event. People
are often not aware of where this information has come
from, and may wrongly attribute information provided
by someone else to the original event. In the context of
the social contagion effect, the source monitoring frame-
work suggests that people recall the information intro-
duced by confederates because the source of this
information is wrongly attributed to the original learning
(Roediger et al., 2001).
Some experiments in this paradigm have examined the
effects of different types of groups and group processes
on the social contagion effect. For example, Meade and
Roediger (2002) found that the social contagion effect
was stronger when a real, present confederate introduced
the incorrect items, compared to when participants read a
written summary that included the misinformation. Also,
the presence of dissenters in the group weakened the
social contagion effect (Walther et al., 2002). Addition-
ally, there is some evidence that memory contagion effects
may be more likely to occur in discussion with a roman-
tic partner than a stranger (French, Garry, & Mori,
2006).
Whereas some experimenters have attempted to extend
this social contagion paradigm to more ecologically valid
stimuli, particularly in the forensic context (e.g., Gabbert
et al., 2003), this research has not yet examined emotional,
personally experienced autobiographical memories (but for
examples of other false memory research see Garry & Ger-
rie, 2005; Loftus, 2005, 1997; Sharman, Garry, & Beuke,
2004).3.4. What needs to be measured
Looking across these approaches and methods, there is
much that we can fruitfully adopt and adapt. For exam-
ple, the transactive memory literature suggests ways in
which memories might be shared across individuals in
some, but not necessarily in all types of groups. The col-
laborative recall and social contagion literatures highlight
useful ways to index the varying influences of collabora-
tion. As already noted, these literatures, as they currently
stand, have their limitations. In terms of explanations, in
the collaborative recall and social contagion literatures in
particular there is a large gap between what researchers
claim or hope to study—collective memory processes—
and the Triggering Thesis explanations they typically
invoke, whereby remembering is seen as a cognitive pro-
cess that takes place only and completely inside the heads
of individuals (although it can be influenced by social
phenomena). In terms of cases, although transactive
memory theory, for instance, makes clear predictions
about the kinds of groups that should show benefits of
collaboration, there has been no real attempt within
other cognitive paradigms to survey across a full range
of memory cases and remembering groups. Most research
in these traditions has involved individuals learning mun-
dane, identical material and then recalling it collabora-
tively in convenience groups of mere acquaintances or
strangers (undergraduate students); this does not really
capture the full range of human remembering experi-
ences. In terms of assumptions, while transactive memory
assumes that collaboration can be positive, collaborative
recall and social contagion are pessimistic about social
influences on memory (but see Roediger et al., 2001).
In these paradigms, memories are counted up and a
lower number is invariably considered a poorer outcome
for the group. Finally, in terms of what is measured,
dependent variables in collaborative recall and social con-
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and its accuracy. This not only neglects the qualitative
effects of collaboration, but completely misses the func-
tion of collaborating in groups about memories.
We believe that existing concepts and methods from
cognitive psychology can be significantly extended and
applied to a whole range of social memory phenomena
when they are embedded within the theoretical framework
of distributed cognition. In order to account adequately for
the complete range of cases, we need studies that vary on at
least the following six dimensions:
• Does the social distribution of memory concern the
experiencing (encoding) or the remembering (retrieving)
of an event?
 Is the experiencing of an event shared or unshared? Are the shared experiences generated accidentally
or through more meaningful, intended joint
activities?
 Are unshared experiences distinct or similar across
the individuals who have them?
 Is the activity of remembering undertaken or mani-
fested individually or as a member of a group?
 Is the activity of remembering as a member of a
group minimally collaborative (e.g., turn-taking)
or collaborative in some deeper sense (e.g., joint
revisions)?
Considered together, these dimensions delineate a space
of possibilities for further studies of social memory phe-
nomena along the lines of the studies that we report below.
And in developing a fruitful empirical framework within
which to explore the role of social processes across this
range of cases, we should design experiments that measure
the following (independent and dependent) factors and
variables, which we discuss in turn below:
• the costs and benefits of remembering in groups
• the parameters of group influence
• the fate of memories
• the function of group memory
Costs and benefits. In contemporary culture, external
influences on personal memory often have been demonised
as necessarily negative, leading inevitably to forgetting or
distortion. But collaborating in remembering has clear
benefits. Although research involving collaborative recall
and social contagion has more typically focused on the
costs of remembering in groups, these paradigms can mea-
sure the benefits as easily as the costs (e.g., Basden et al.,
2000). Research needs to index whether people recall
more, less, accurately, inaccurately, differently after col-
laborating. With collaborative recall and social contagion,
we can index variables including: memories recalled vs.
forgotten (since good forgetting is as important as good
remembering), accurate vs. inaccurate recall (since groups
are just as likely to misremember as individuals) and mem-ory quality (since memory quality, not just accessibility,
may change).
Parameters of group influence. As noted in Section 2,
and emphasised by our review of different research tradi-
tions, there is no agreed canonical definition of what
counts as a group. Across the transactive memory, collab-
orative recall and social contagion literatures, group
membership has varied from people who meet for the first
time in their experiment to people in long-standing rela-
tionships. Similarly, group dynamics, in terms of the type
of ‘‘sharing’’ that the group members engaged in, have
varied from the minimal collaboration of enforced turn-
taking to the more genuine collaboration of a married
couple remembering or problem solving as they would
at home. Research should systematically investigate the
effect of variations in the size, nature, aims, coherence
and deliberative procedures of groups on the ways in
which they and their members deal with the past. With
collaborative recall and social contagion procedures, we
can and should extend manipulations of the parameters
of group influence, including the size and type of group,
the manner of collaboration, the similarity (or sharing)
of memories and retrieval strategies, and social and moti-
vational factors.
The fate of memories. Some discussions of ‘‘collective
memory’’ have focused on the ways in which individuals’
disparate memories of an event may become more similar
over time—more shared—by talking together about the
past. The possibility of such ‘‘mnemonic convergence’’
(Hirst, Manier, & Cuc, 2003) demands that research map
how individuals’ memories change over time, especially
after group collaboration. Although collaborative recall
and social contagion have focused mostly on the costs of
collaborating, these paradigms can map the fate of memo-
ries across repeated tests and as groups form, part, and
reform: what did the participant remember vs. forget indi-
vidually at time 1, collaboratively at time 2, then individu-
ally at time 3? Even studies of simple word lists indicate
that as individuals lose memories, groups gain them (Bas-
den et al., 2000). With collaborative recall and social con-
tagion we can index the epidemiology of remembering;
why, in Hirst et al. (2003) terms some memories spread
quickly, but other die off.
The function of group memory. As noted in Section 2,
autobiographical memory plays an important role in the
daily life of individuals and groups: in defining identity,
in teaching and communicating, in developing and main-
taining relationships, in representing (individual or group)
self to self and to others. By extending cognitive memory
paradigms outside the relatively contrived social context
of the laboratory and among real groups—to families,
school friends, couples, business associates, etc.—we can
consider the function of group memory. What do the mem-
ories mean to the individuals and to their groups? How do
memories contribute to a sense of (individual and group)
identity? Is remembering in groups motivated in the same
way as individual memory?
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In Sections 2 and 3 above we laid out a conceptual and
empirical framework for investigating social influences on
memory. In this Section we describe early empirical work
in which we are putting this framework into action. The
aim of our early work has been to adapt and use collabo-
rative recall and social contagion paradigms in ways that
build on their extensive existing database, that significantly
extend the range of memory cases studied to date, that
focus on personal and significant autobiographical memo-
ries across a range of ‘‘shared’’ and ‘‘unshared’’ cases, and
that develop the features of our empirical framework.
4.1. Social contagion of autobiographical memories
Our first study adapted the social contagion paradigm to
recent, significant autobiographical events experienced and
remembered by 48 (28 female, 18 male) university students
from the University of New South Wales. In our version of
the paradigm (based closely on Roediger et al., 2001), par-
ticipants were (individually) prompted to recall and
describe memories of important recent events: their 19th
birthday, their first HSC exam,1 their school graduation
dance, and their first day of university. In a session 1 week
later, they took turns with a confederate to describe their
autobiographical memories of the different events. For
instance, the participant described his or her (genuine)
memory of their 18th birthday, and then the confederate
described his or her (apparent) memory of their 18th birth-
day; the confederate’s ‘‘memories’’ were standardised
scripted versions that we wrote. In the next phase of the
study, the participant and the confederate took turns to
describe back to their recall partner the five or six most
important parts of the other person’s memory of each
event. So, the participant described the five or six most
important points of the confederate’s (apparent) 18th
birthday memory, then the confederate described the five
or six most important points of the participant’s (genuine)
18th birthday memory. Notably, as one of the five or six
points, the confederate included a contagion item (for
two of the four events): a piece of either positive or nega-
tive information that the participant had not generated
about their event (e.g., for the 18th birthday memory, the
confederate might say that the participant recalled ‘‘you
thought that this was a big turning point in your life’’).
In the final phase, the participant and confederate sepa-
rated for a final individual recall; the confederate did not
recall (Fig. 4).
In terms of our distinctions and dimensions, partici-
pants’ experiences were unshared, but similar. Although
each participant did not experience the events (e.g., their
18th birthday) with their collaborating partner (the confed-1 HSC refers to ‘‘Higher School Certificate’’. It is the group of major
exams sat by all final year high school students in New South Wales,
Australia.erate), the confederate described similar events. But their
remembering was in a group; their collaboration was mod-
erately interactive—it was more than turn taking but less
than truly co-constructing a joint past. This study also
allowed us to index the costs and benefits of remembering
in a group (what and how they remembered vs. what and
how they forgot).
We found a strong social contagion effect for autobio-
graphical memories. Overall, approximately 30% of partic-
ipants included in their final recall at least one social
contagion idea unit for at least one event where the confed-
erate introduced a contagion item (cf., Meade & Roediger,
2002; Roediger et al., 2001). For example, participants who
received the contagion item for their 18th birthday mem-
ory, ‘‘you thought that this was a big turning point in your
life’’, often included either this exact piece of information
or the gist of it in their final recall. Sometimes the effect
was more subtle: at initial recall one participant said there
were 30 people at her birthday party, after the contagion
item of ‘‘a big turning point’’, she said there were 70 people
at her birthday party. There was no difference in the ‘‘take
up’’ of positive and negative contagion items, although
contagion was more successful for some events than others
(e.g., 18th birthday party vs. first day at university).
We also found a very high level of unsuggested conta-
gion, whereby the participant incorporated into their final
recall new information that appeared to come from the
confederate’s ‘‘memories’’. Of course, the confederate’s
memories might simply have prompted recall by the
participant of a previously unmentioned genuine element
of their experience of the event, as the Triggering Thesis
would suggest. But alternatively, our findings may indicate
a form of Social Manifestation, in that brief collaboration
with a virtual stranger, the confederate, was sufficient to
slightly alter the later remembering of participants’ private
experiences. Of particular note, some participants adopted
and elaborated on information presented by the confeder-
ate into their own autobiographical memories. This high-
lights the robust nature of the social contagion paradigm
and its value in exploring the consequences of collaborative
shaping of shared and even unshared autobiographical
events.
4.2. Collaborative flashbulb memories of the death of Steve
Irwin
Our second study adapted the collaborative recall para-
digm to focus on another way that events become socially
shared—when they are culturally important and receive
extensive media coverage. Memories of events like these
can become ‘‘flashbulb memories’’ (Brown & Kulik,
1977; Conway, 1995), where individuals maintain long-
standing vivid (but not necessarily accurate) memories of
hearing about the event (e.g., for flashbulb memory studies
of the Challenger space shuttle disaster, of the death of
Diana, Princess of Wales, and of 9/11; see Curci & Lumi-
net, 2006; Kvavilashvili, Mirani, Schlagman, & Kornbrot,
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Fig. 4. Social contagion of autobiographical memory procedure.
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both individually and socially, and are remembered both
individually and socially. Another feature of culturally sig-
nificant events is that one’s social group can dictate a set of
norms about how we should react or think about such an
event (Skowronski & Walker, 2004).
On the afternoon of the 4th of September 2006 news
broke that Steve Irwin, Australian entertainer and ‘‘wildlife
warrior’’, had been killed by a stingray while filming a doc-
umentary in far North Queensland. Both in Australia and
worldwide, the news of Steve Irwin’s death was met with
large-scale public grief. His death and its aftermath domi-
nated the media for weeks afterwards, was the subject of
tributes and memorials, and any criticism of Irwin was
treated harshly by the media (Coultan, Coorey, & Tadros,
2006; Wainwright & Baker, 2006; Williams & Hearn,
2006). In this context of public mourning and commemora-
tion, we asked 69 university students from the University of
New South Wales to come to our laboratory and discuss
their memories of hearing about Steve Irwin’s death and
their reactions to the news. These interviews took place
over a period of 5 weeks, between 2 and 7 weeks following
Irwin’s death (Fig. 5).Collaborative groups
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Fig. 5. Collaborative recall of StFirst we asked all participants to complete a survey
about their memory for the events of Steve Irwin’s death.
We asked them to provide: personal autobiographical
details (e.g., where they were, how they found out), seman-
tic knowledge about the event (e.g., how Irwin died, how
the media responded), and ratings of their beliefs and feel-
ings about the impact and significance of Irwin’s death,
both for themselves and for Australians in general. Follow-
ing this survey, half of the participants took part in collab-
orative recall of Irwin’s death. In groups of three, we asked
them to discuss together for 10 min their experiences of the
events surrounding Irwin’s death and their reactions to his
death. The other half of the participants took part in indi-
vidual recall. Individually, we asked them to think for
10 min about their experiences of the event and their reac-
tions and to write down on a piece of paper whatever came
to mind. We emailed all participants 1 week after this ses-
sion and again one month after this session and asked them
to complete a second and then a third version of the origi-
nal survey. In other words, participants provided autobio-
graphical details, semantic knowledge, and ratings about
Steve Irwin’s death on three occasions: (1) at the beginning
of the experiment and before collaborative or individualCALL 2 (1 week later)  RECALL 3 (1 month later) 













eve Irwin’s death procedure.
46 A.J. Barnier et al. / Cognitive Systems Research 9 (2008) 33–51recall, (2) 1 week after the session and after collaborative or
individual recall, and (3) one month after the session and
after collaborative or individual recall.
In terms of our distinctions and dimensions, participants
experienced the events surrounding Steve Irwin’s death
individually (or at least not with their collaborating part-
ners), but their experiences were similar and knowledge
about and reactions to this event were extensively shared
in the public domain. Our participants’ remembering, at
least within the context of our experiment, was either in a
group or individual. But of course, most participants had
talked about—had shared—their reactions to Irwin’s death
before they arrived in our laboratory. Those who collabo-
rated in the study did so very interactively, as we’ll see
below. This study also allowed us to index the costs and
benefits of remembering in a group (what and how they
remembered vs. what and how they forgot) and the fate
of memories (how their memories changed over time, espe-
cially after group interaction).
In the free recall session, we noticed that the themes that
emerged during the discussion were quite different from
those that emerged when participants thought and wrote
about the event alone. Participants who thought and wrote
about the event alone were more likely to say they were
personally upset by Irwin’s death, while participants who
discussed the event were likely to minimize their own per-
sonal emotional reaction to the event. However, both
groups of participants were likely to mention that they
were sad for Irwin’s family. Both groups of participants
mentioned experiencing shock and disbelief when hearing
of Irwin’s death, but during discussion participants fre-
quently mentioned that the event was not surprising, given
the dangerous nature of Irwin’s job. Whereas people who
thought and wrote about the event alone often emphasised
the significance of the event and Irwin’s ‘hero’ status, par-
ticipants who discussed the event often said that the media
exaggerated Irwin’s importance; these participants mini-
mized the significance of the event.
The following excerpt from a discussion demonstrates
the process of negotiation that occurred during the group
discussion, where the appropriate reaction to the event
and its meaning were established:
K: I know people who cried when they were watching
the memorial service when Bindi was doing her speech
E: Yeah, that was really sad! I don’t know anybody who
actually cried. . .
M: Did you cry?
K: Can’t say that I did.
M: Do you know anyone who cares at all?
E: I don’t think people. . .
K: I think people feel bad for him, a lot of people. . .
M: People die every day. . .
One notable feature of this exchange is the lack of personal
identification with the emotions mentioned; emotions are
attributed to ‘‘people’’ in general, rather than to individualparticipants. This contrasts with the comments made by
individuals, who wrote things like: ‘‘[Irwin] will be remem-
bered throughoutAustralia andworldwide history forever’’;
‘‘it feels as though you know him, and maybe that is why his
death is so sad’’; ‘‘It is unbelievable how much he affected
everybody’s lives’’; ‘‘to this day, I still feel shock and sadness,
simply because why him? He is such a good person’’.
Collaborative recall not only influenced the content of
recollections during the free recall session, but it influenced
the way participants later remembered their reaction to
hearing the news of Steve Irwin’s death. One week after
the initial recall and free recall session, participants who
discussed the event had significantly reduced their ratings
of how shocked and how upset they had been when they
heard the news, while those who thought and wrote about
the event alone had not significantly changed their ratings.
One month later, all participants rated themselves as being
less upset upon hearing of Irwin’s death than they had ini-
tially. However, participants who discussed the event had
even further reduced their ratings of how shocked they
had been when they heard the news, while the rated shock
of participants who thought and wrote about the event
alone remained the same as at initial recall. Similarly, one
month later, participants who discussed the event rated
Steve Irwin’s death as less significant for Australia than
they had initially, while the ratings of people who thought
and wrote about the event alone remained unchanged. Col-
laborating with others also influenced confidence. One
month after their discussion, participants who collaborated
remained as confident about the semantic details of the
event as they had been in the initial session. Although par-
ticipants who thought and wrote about the event alone
were no less accurate than their collaborating counterparts,
they felt less confident about the semantic details of the
events surrounding Steve Irwin’s death one month after
the session. There was no evidence that participants revised
their ratings simply to meet perceived experimental
demands. They had no access to their initial ratings, they
didn’t seem aware that their 1 week and 1 month ratings
changed, and the ratings of those who collaborated and
those who did not were different; this all argues against
an explanation on the basis that participants explicitly
referred back to their earlier ratings (rather than to their
memories).
These early results suggest that collaborative recall can
be quite easily and usefully extended to more complex
and personally relevant memories. We revealed clear differ-
ences between those who collaborated in memory and
those who remembered alone, especially in terms of the fate
of their memories. Interestingly, these differences were not
in terms of how much or how little was recalled (we did not
focus on accuracy) over repeated tests, but rather in terms
of the qualitative features of individuals’ remembering—
especially during collaboration—and the emotional reac-
tions recalled later about the target event. In this study, col-
laborative recall yielded robust differences between people
who we simply brought together to discuss a culturally
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turn to focus on established, real-world groups, as in our
next study, Study 3.
4.3. Memories of high school at a high school reunion
In our third study, still underway, we approached for-
mer students of a Sydney high school at their 20 year high
school reunion and asked them to complete a survey about
their memories of high school. We asked participants: to
list their school friends and to tell us whether they had kept
in touch, to indicate how often they had thought about or
discussed events that happened in high school (either with
high school friends or with other friends and family), to
describe their memory experiences at the reunion, to recall
the most memorable events from high school, and to recall
as much as possible about four significant events (a football
match, a school musical, their first HSC exam, their grad-
uation dance). In terms of our distinctions and dimensions,
these former high school students experienced the same
events, often together. For many, their experiencing was
not accidental, but rather intentional and truly shared.
However, their remembering was either in a group or indi-
vidual. We were particularly interested in the memories of
former students who maintained contact with their class-
mates over time and those who did not. Thus, this study
allowed us to index the parameters of group influence. This
study also allowed us to index the fate of memories (how
their memories changed over time, especially depending
on group interaction) and the function of group memory
(what the memories meant to the individuals and to their
groups) (Fig. 6).
One male former student reported only occasional con-
tact over the past 20 years. When describing the reunion he
said: ‘‘I thought it interesting that in most conversations INot kept in touch
EXPERIENCE (LEARNING) REMEMBERING 
Kept in touch












Fig. 6. School reunionheard or overheard were mainly discussing current lives
and experiences since school. There was little fond remi-
niscing of school times or discussions of school events.’’
When asked about an important football match that took
place in 1985, this former student wrote: ‘‘I went and I
recall we lost. That’s it.’’
In contrast to this student’s limited contact with his for-
mer classmates and lack of details in remembering, another
former female student reported regular contact over the
past 20 years. In fact, she married one of her classmates.
She wrote: ‘‘It is an advantage having my school friends
as my dearest friends & husband as we often recall our
school days but usually just revisiting the same classic sto-
ries’’. Her survey responses described many events in great
detail. When asked about the football match, she wrote:
‘‘Thank God they made the final as they (Rugby bods)
were a bit precious at school. Our Captain and the rest
of the footyheads up against the slick outfit from St. Eddy’s
including a young Ricky Stuart who was playing in the
final again after repeating yr 12 but shows up driving a
lovely new Honda. [Our Captain] played v. well but was
always overshadowed by Ricky, even when Australian
Schoolboys team was selected. . . .Don’t remember much
of the game spent more time socialising as I (& everybody
else) never expected us to win. It was a school spirit/sup-
port event with a friend in the team, classmates too . . .
otherwise I wasn’t that interested.’’
Another former student, a male, who maintained regu-
lar contact with classmates over the past 20 years and
who had friends in the football team similarly described
the football match in great detail. When asked whether
being at the reunion triggered specific memories of high
school, he wrote: ‘‘Looking at the new sports hall and
the trophy cabinet standing with my mate bought back a
memory of how the First 15 [the rugby team] made it toOVER TIME RESPONSES TO SURVEY 
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kept in contact with after school played in that match,
and I was there to support. The trophy cabinet jogged that
memory.’’ When asked specifically about the football
match, he wrote: ‘‘[The School’s] First 15 made it to the
Waratah Shield Final in 1985. Two mates were in the team.
It was played at the SCG as the curtain raiser to the Aus-
tralian V Fiji Rugby Test. We played St Edmonds from
Canberra. We were beaten by them and in particular one
player. Their half back was Ricky Stuart who went on to
be a great halfback in rugby league and is currently the
Australian Rugby League Coach. We had a bus supplied
to take the supporters to the SCG. We had to go down
in our uniforms. We sat on the old hill to watch the game.’’
One interpretation of these individual differences in rec-
ollection, consistent with the Triggering Thesis, is that
these former students simply had different experiences at
the time and different memory styles now. However, the
sharing of experiencing and the sharing of remembering
seemed to flavour the quantity and quality of their recollec-
tions of high school events, findings more consistent with
the Social Manifestation Thesis. For instance, when asked
about their first HSC exam, the first male student who
mostly fell out of contact with school friends wrote: ‘‘I
think it was English. Arrived at the hall for the exam, took
the test and drove home to prepare for my other exams.
Nothing special really.’’ In contrast, the second male stu-
dent who (interestingly) had friends in common with the
first male student, but who kept in contact and indicated
that he and his friends regularly discussed school events
during the past 20 years, described this first exam in colour-
ful detail. He wrote: ‘‘I got to my exam early—English. At
the time we had ID cards that had to be on you so to sit the
exam. My best mate forgot his ID card. I had a car—red
Holden HR—so I drove my mate to his home in [name
of suburb] to pick up his ID card. We drove like a bat
out of hell as time was running out. We got back to the
school and everyone had entered the hall. We were the last
two in. Everyone was seated—the exam had not started.
My mate sat relatively close to the door (surname starting
with M) but for me surname starting with A I had to walk
right across the whole hall to my seat. Most embarrassing.
Got through the exam OK, had a big laugh about being
late after the exam.’’ He and his mate remained close
friends for 20 years and one can imagine them revisiting
this event again and again and laughing.
In the next phase of this study we plan to invite the fol-
lowing groups of former classmates back to the laboratory
for a collaborative recall study in which we explore their
individual and group remembering: (a) groups of former
students who were friends and who kept in touch, (b)
groups of former students who were friends but who fell
out of touch, and (c) groups of former students who were
not friends at school. In this way, we can start to map
the impact of the group on the fate and function of shared
and unshared autobiographical memories, and whether
new capacities emerge when people remember with others.5. Concluding remarks
Sue Campbell has recently argued (in press) that many
philosophers are attracted to what we have called the Trig-
gering Thesis—the idea that social and other external fac-
tors are merely cues or triggers to the individual’s
internal memory processes—both because it seems to shore
up epistemological confidence in our autonomous access to
truths about the past, and because it draws clean lines
around the boundaries of the person. They are nervous,
Campbell suggests, that if the sharing of memories
‘‘amounts to more than cuing, then somehow the integrity
of the self as a record of its own history has given way and
is giving way all the time and in ways that we cannot even
track’’ (p. 4). We agree with Campbell, in contrast, that
such alarmism should be resisted, because it is ordinary
and appropriate for both self and memory to be socially
manifested (Campbell, in press, p. 3):
Sharing memory is how we learn to remember, how we
come to reconceive our pasts in memory, how we come
to form a sense of self, and one of the primary ways in
which we come to know others and form relationships
with them, reforming our sense of self as we come
repeatedly under the influence not only of our own pasts
as understood by others but of the pasts of others.
To this salutary reminder of the range of social memory
phenomena, in this paper we have added, firstly, a distinct
theoretical basis for understanding the social distribution
of cognition, which can place different cases in a multidi-
mensional space, and, secondly, a number of extensions
and new applications of existing paradigms in the cognitive
psychology of memory. Our initial empirical studies,
reported in Section 4, are first steps towards broader inves-
tigations into the costs and benefits of remembering in
groups, the parameters of group influence, the fate of mem-
ories over time, and the function of group memory. As we
seek to apply the distributed cognition framework to more
complex real-world examples of the social distribution of
remembering, further conceptual and methodological inno-
vations will be required, and the resources of cognitive psy-
chology and the philosophy of mind will need to be still
more thoroughly integrated.
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